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A HOUSING REGIME UNCHANGED:  
THE RISE AND FALL OF FOREIGN-CURRENCY 
LOANS IN HUNGARY 
Adrienne Csizmady, József Hegedüs and Diána Vonnák 1
ABSTRACT  This paper analyzes the expansion and crisis of the foreign-currency 
(FX) loan market and responding mortgage-rescue programs in Hungary. We 
assess changes in the housing regime and illustrate the process through analyzing 
interactions between individual and institutional (state, financial institution, and 
municipality) strategies. We argue that the current, malformed housing regime 
has not changed significantly and remains vulnerable to similar events. This 
particular case offers insight into regional tendencies, while also explaining the 
reasons behind the escalation of the crisis in Hungary. We claim that the coping 
strategies and broader behavior of participants reinforced the disproportionate 
elements of the housing regime. Since 2015, housing policies have again relied on 
economic stabilization, now subsidized by the EU, that incentivize market solutions 
for private home ownership and disregard the experiences of past decades.
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INTRODUCTION
Analyzes of Eastern European housing policies agree that the political-
economic transition of 1989-90 radically transformed the housing regime in 
the region. The mass privatization of public housing and the development of 
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housing finance institutions to support home ownership were key elements 
of the transition (e.g Roy 2008). Changing tenure has been modelled through 
typologies, most notably by Kemeny (1995), but such attempts stop at 
description and fail to address the different components (state, family, market) 
and ideologies that underpin certain models. Moreover, the characteristics of the 
emerging post-transition housing regime(s) remain under debate (e.g. Tsenkova, 
2009, Hegedüs and Tosics, 1996, Hegedüs et al., 1996, Pichler-Milanovic, 2001, 
Lowe, 2003). In this paper, agreeing with Stephens (et al. 2015), we argue that 
it is crucial to embed typologies of housing systems into their ideological and 
socio-political context. In doing so, we follow Clapham’s (2002, 2005) approach 
that argues that changes in housing regimes result from the interaction between 
policy measures and individual housing pathways, and offer an analysis of the 
Hungarian housing system throughout the 2008 economic crisis.
It is especially important to elucidate the socio-political context in analyzes 
of post-socialist housing systems, as they are products of a significant transition 
and volatile institutional histories. Moments of risk and crisis can expose 
their vulnerability and result in heavily politicized public debates about the 
distribution of responsibilities. The situation in Hungary was an especially 
strong example of this, its mortgage market having been among the hardest hit 
of all countries in and after 2008.
The housing system faced to two basic challenges in Hungary, and in the 
region overall. First, low-income households were forced into the lower end 
of the housing market, often into marginalized substandard housing, due to 
privatization. Second, as the former state housing subsidy and finance system 
disappeared, access to housing for middle-income groups was increasingly 
based on family support because of the lack of an affordable housing finance 
system. By 2000, after recovery from the transitional recession, many post-
socialist countries made attempts to respond to these challenges. The pitfalls 
of the post-socialist housing regime were understood, aspirations existed to 
amend them. This involved a push to develop a market housing finance system, 
and plans to expand the social housing sector. However, political and economic 
interests related to the former were always more pronounced, often leaving the 
latter lower on the agenda. While the countries in the region experienced similar 
challenges, the timing and range of institutional solutions differed substantially 
(Hegedüs and Struyk, 2005, Aidukaite, 2014, Hegedüs et al. 2011, Dübel et al. 
2006, Mandic and Cirman, 2012).
In Hungary, mortgage lending enjoyed political and fiscal support from the 
government, and the share of mortgages compared to the GDP rapidly grew 
between 2000 and 2004. After 2004, subsidized mortgages were replaced by 
foreign currency loans; the speed with which this market expanded in Hungary 
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was comparable only to the situation in the Baltic States (Barel et al. 2009). The 
financial crisis of 2008 hit the Hungarian economy, and the household payment 
burden associated with foreign currency (FX) loans increased substantially, 
which caused political and social conflict. The Hungarian government 
introduced a series of different measures to “rescue” borrowers. This paper 
traces the process that led to the emergence of housing finance based on FX loan 
products, and provides an assessment of governmental programs that sought 
to alleviate the crisis and the reactions to these across the housing system. We 
argue that by 2015, when the economy recovered, the housing regime faced the 
same challenges as it did 15 years earlier. In spite of the institutional differences 
among the transitional countries, the basic challenges were still not addressed. 
Having reconstructed the processes leading to the FX loan boom, we look at 
the ways households reacted to the emerging borrowing opportunities and how 
they coped with the hardship of the increasing payment burdens caused by the 
financial crisis. The research is based on qualitative interviews and was designed 
to reveal the varieties of household strategy both at the time loans were taken out 
and the time of the crisis. Through life course interviews we illustrate how the 
failure of the housing finance system forced households to accept compromised 
housing choices and family help, and to move into the informal economy, 
giving up dreams of home ownership. Although the material presented here is 
not meant to support generalization, it allows us to demonstrate the importance 
of the interplay of  household behavior, and the policy of housing institutions. 
This contribution helps to demonstrate the need to move beyond institutional 
approaches. Highlighting the varieties of coping strategies and the choices of 
the most vulnerable segment of society adds nuance to  understanding the crisis, 
now using hindsight, and taking the eventual outcomes of mitigation programs 
into consideration. 
The paper is based on mixed-methods research. We offer a synthesis and 
reinterpretation of pre-existing data about mortgage development in Hungary, 
supplemented with expert interviews with key decision makers. When 
addressing household responses and the public discourse around the FX loan 
crisis, we rely on media analysis as well as 30 structured, in-depth interviews 
with FX debtors, and an additional nine further cases from parallel research 
projects. The sample is intentionally non-representative, its function being to 
elucidate the variety of household strategies and the interplay between policy 
measures and household behavior (Small, 2009).2
First, we explain the way we conceptualize housing regimes, offering a 
Stylized summary of the main features of post-socialist housing systems. 
2  For the list of the interviews, see the Appendix.
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Afterwards, we describe the development of the mortgage market after 2000, 
and interpret the conflicts that emerged in connection to the financial crises. The 
final part of the paper focuses on the varieties of individual housing strategies, 
and the interaction between rescues programs and individual coping strategies. 
The second and the third part together offer a concise overview of the FX crisis 
in Hungary through which we hope to corroborate our methodological claim; 
i.e. the benefits of adopting an integrative approach when modelling housing 
systems in general.
1. INTERPRETING HOUSING REGIMES:  
STRUCTURE AND INTERACTIONS
1.1. The sub-market matrix as an analytical tool for modelling 
challenges
The political and economic transformation of 1989-90 brought about substantial 
changes in housing systems in Eastern Europe. There are three main approaches 
to understanding housing systems. Literature on housing in the 1980s was defined 
by the housing provision approach that focused on the embeddedness of housing 
(e.g. Ball and Harloe 1992). Here, housing forms represent modes of production 
and distribution, a view based on structuralist assumptions, hence they are 
socio-politically determined. Institutional economics remained a dominant 
approach as well (Matznetter, 2002, Matznetter and Mundt, 2012, Malpass, 
2008, Lunquist, 1990, Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2014); this places significantly 
less emphasis on the socio-political context, or causal links between these and 
institutions. Finally, Kemeny’s tenure typology (1995; Kemeny et al. 2005) and 
followers focused on the structure of the rental sector in a given country and 
introduced a division between universal and residual sections. In Kemeny’s 
model, socio-economic structures and mainstream ideologies are reflected in 
the housing system.
We find institutionalist approaches to be insufficient for addressing the 
broader context and consequences of housing regimes. In order to move beyond 
this, our approach builds on recent work by Hegedüs (2018) that departs from 
a combination of the tenure and provision approach, developing a typology 
of housing provision based on a sub-market matrix. Our argument is in line 
with that of Barlow and Duncan (1988) who criticized the one-sidedness of 
the tenure approach and instead combined ownership form with the form of 
production in their typology. Arguing that these are insufficient for addressing 
the social consequences of respective housing regimes, we suggest following 
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Polanyi’s argument about the role market, redistribution and reciprocity play 
as integrative mechanisms of social and institutional systems (Polanyi 1944). 
Our approach hence conceptualizes the provision dimension of housing systems 
through these, with an additional category of exclusion, to better theorize the 
limits of integration. In terms of the forms of tenure, we have followed the 
mainstream approach. 
Table 1. Framework for the comparative analysis of housing regimes, with internation-
al examples 
Source: authors’ compilation
The housing regime is an interpretation of a housing system according to 
the logic of the sub-market matrix, where differences between regimes emerge 
as the result of the structure of the matrix and the connected legal and fiscal 
regulations, as well as widely shared political ideas related to housing. Housing 
regimes are inseparable from their surrounding contexts: economic development, 
the structure of the labor market, welfare regimes, and the redistribution of 
wealth. The sub-market matrix and the definition of housing regimes together 
allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the social consequences of 
housing systems. For example, state intervention could be efficient through ‘B’ 
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or ‘C types of provision which both use non-public ownership models to achieve 
public goals.  
Transition was conceptualized as the approximation of the housing regimes 
of former socialist countries to regimes found in Western European countries 
(Kemeny and Lowe 1998). To illustrate the trajectory of post-socialist housing 
systems, we use a simplified figure (Figure 1), wherein sub-market matrices are 
characterized by a solid home-owner sector and a large social and private rental 
stock. These could loosely be called Western European housing systems, with 
the caveat that housing systems are very different within that region too, due to 
divergent historical and political ideological trajectories. As such, this model 
represents an ideal type rather than the existing reality.3
In contrast to this, Figure 2 indicates the weak points of the post-socialist 
housing system. The most significant difference is the virtual lack of a social 
housing sector; i.e., regulated forms of housing integrated by the state that 
offer a safe and satisfactory option for the lower-income social strata. Market 
solutions for housing acquisition by the middle class that can operate without 
significant state subsidies are also lacking because of the underdevelopment of 
the housing mortgage system. 
As in other countries in the region, two major shifts took place in Hungary after 
1990. On the one hand, the proportion of state-owned housing stock fell from 
21% to 3% between 1990 and 2001 (Székely, 2011). The stock that remained in 
state ownership was usually of worse quality. On the other hand, state subsidies 
and the housing finance model were diminished. The above-outlined issues (i.e. 
the lack of social housing programs and affordable housing finance) represented 
the most important challenges at the beginning of the new millennium. Some 
programs aimed at increasing the social sector and the market-based finance 
system at the cost of the owner-occupied-reciprocal type (type ‘J’ in Table 1). 
The high share of type ‘J’ provisions meant the predominance of cash-based 
transactions and reliance on the family, a situation which is described in the 
new literature as a ‘familial housing finance system’ (e.g. Bohle 2018; Stephens 
et al. 2015).
3  Several attempts have been made to conceptualize individual differences in Western European 
housing systems. Kemeny’s approach, which distinguishes between residual and integrated rental 
models based on the relationship between social and market rental (Kemeny 1995, Kemeny et 
al. 2005), and Haffner’s analysis of rental systems according to the legal, financial, distributional 
“gap” between them (Haffner et al. 2009), are powerful explanatory tools.
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Figure 1. Stylized sub-market matrix in home 
ownership-based housing system (Western 
Europe)
Figure 2. Stylized post-socialist sub-
market matrix indicating the direction of 
proposed change according to housing policy 
implemented in 2000
 
Source: authors’ compilation
By the time the economy was consolidated in Hungary in around 2000, these 
challenges were obvious to policy-makers, yet their political currency was 
far from equal. Political and budgetary support for social housing programs 
remained insufficient, while the portfolio-related decisions of the home-owning 
upper-middle class remained decisive. The risks associated with private rental 
remained high thanks to bad regulation, which curtailed growth. As elsewhere 
in the region, housing was not fully financialized in Hungary; still, housing 
finance programs retained their importance everywhere, albeit with diverse 
institutional solutions and mortgage lending volume (Hegedüs and Struyk, 
2005, Stephens et al. 2015).
1.2. Institutional and household strategies 
The behavior of households and institutions in the housing market can 
constitutes the dynamic element of the housing regime in the matrix we use. 
We second Clapham in stating that “the impact of policies can only be gauged 
through an understanding of the complex interplay between organizational 
policies and their implementation and the way that applicants for housing react 
in the light of their perception and attitude” (2002: 57). Housing regimes change 
when households and institutions react to economic, political and financial 
circumstances, shaped by prevailing norms and ideologies. Their decisions 
bring about changes in the sub-market matrix, and in housing solutions, as 
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represented in the cells in Table 1. It is therefore important to assess the key 
elements in institutional and individual housing-related decision making. 
Household pathways highlight the importance of alternatives: decision-making 
mechanisms and motivations vary widely (Lin 2012). 
Strategies related to career, pension, savings, and consumption patterns are 
intimately linked to housing decisions, thanks to the role housing plays as an 
asset in households’ portfolio and in welfare systems (e.g. Ronald, 2008; Ronald 
and Elsinga, 2011). As crisis in any domain of life has repercussions for the 
rest, such correlations should be factored in when modelling housing strategies 
and housing systems. Familiaism is especially important in housing regimes 
when access to loans is curtailed. Such support is not predictable and reliable, 
and it often comes with risks of its own – it should form an integral part of our 
understanding of post-socialist housing regimes.
Like that of households, the behavior of institutions – be they government 
organizations, banks, or real estate agencies – is shaped by the fiscal, institutional 
and policy context they operate in. The mission of institutions might be at cross 
purposes with their political and financial targets. For instance, a key mission 
of local governments is supporting low-income residents with social housing 
options, yet financial constraints and electoral strategies often push the former 
to rid themselves of difficult tenants. NGOs committed to social initiatives also 
have to juggle their priorities, while institutional survival and the need to pay 
employees fairly might strain their budgets at the expense of core mission (Le 
Grand, 2003).
Finally, households and institutions operate in an unpredictable environment. 
With the advent of global capitalism and rapid urbanization, economic hazards 
and crises have become intrinsic to economic development; contemporary 
European societies are risk societies (Beck 1992, Giddens 1999). Economic 
recession, unpredictability, and the transformation of the role of the state in 
Eastern Europe resulted in an increase in the importance of informality; this 
concerns economic activities as much as labor arrangements, and includes 
strong reliance on family and friends (Pavlovskaya 2004, Ries 1997). These 
complexities have to be accounted for when drawing up a full picture of housing 
regimes.
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2. MORTGAGE BOOM AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
2.1. The development of the mortgage market between 2000 and 
2015
As noted above, policy makers and decision makers understood the 
contradictions and weaknesses of the post-socialist housing regime in Hungary. 
No official housing strategy was laid out by the government, but inside sources 
indicate the following were present; suggestions for an increase in social housing 
sector, the construction of new stock for rent, and supporting the construction 
and purchase of privately owned homes with mortgages (see Növekedéskutató 
Intézet 1999, GM 2000, Otthon Európában 2003). Similar trends characterized 
housing policies across the region. In Hungary, three stages can be identified in 
housing politics between 2000 and 2015.
Stage 1: Subsidized loans (2000-2004)
The first Fidesz government (1998-2002) launched two programs after 2000: 
one was designed to increase the social housing stock; the other targeted the 
mortgage market. These were clearly designed to compensate for the above-
described discrepancies, although the strategy was never set out in a policy 
document. Governmental and institutional interest groups substantially diverted 
this agenda: the key conflict took place between banks and the construction lobby, 
with the triumph of the former (Hegedüs 2006). The council housing program 
did not amount to a breakthrough in social housing, but it still demonstrated 
that local governments were capable partners in social housing issues if given 
appropriate fiscal means. However, throughout its four years of operation, this 
program increased the number of social housing units by less than the number of 
units that left the sector in the years of “trickled” privatization between 1998 and 
2004 (Hegedüs 2011: 120). Moreover, the financial burden of social housing was 
placed on local governments themselves, which made it virtually impossible to 
foster long-term interest in supporting social housing programs on their side4.
Government politicians saw mortgage subsidies as the cornerstone of their 
re-election strategies and promoted them to significantly broaden support.
(Várhegyi 2002). Mortgage subsidies became so successful that the amount that 
4  It is worth noting that other countries in the region ran into similar problems. The most successful 
program was developed in Slovakia, where loan regulations prescribed for owners of social housing 
financially feasible rent payments (Hojsik, 2013).
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was lent grew more than seven-fold between 2000 and 2003, which turned out 
to be unsustainable from a fiscal point of view. The newly elected Socialist-Free 
Democrat coalition maintained subsidies for the next two years. The proportion 
of the value of mortgages in relation to GDP grew from 1.1% to 10% between 
2000 and 2004 while construction boomed and prices rose, but not to the extent 
that led to a price bubble (Table 2).
Table 2. The housing market: key indicators, 2000-2015 (Source: KSH, FHB price 
index, MNB)
Number of 
transac-
tions (new 
and used)
Number 
of housing 
units in use
Number of 
con-
struction 
permits
FHB price 
index 
deflated 
according 
to year 
2000=100
Mortgages 
(billion 
HUF)
Proportion 
of FX loans 
in the loan 
market
Proportion 
of value of 
mortgages 
to GDP  
2000 183 950 21 583 44 709 100 192 1% 1,4%
2004 171 678 43 913 57 459 135 2 106 1% 10,0%
2008 154 097 36 075 43 862 125 6 507 63% 23,9%
2012 87 957 10 560 10 600 88 5 752 68% 20,0%
2015 134 101 7 612 12 515 99 4 691 64% 13,7%
Source: authors’ compilation
Stage 2: The expansion of the FX loan market (2005-2008)
The Socialist-Free Democrat coalition that came to power in 2002 gradually 
decreased loan subsidies, bringing about the perceived threat that the housing 
loan market would collapse. Foreign currency loans, first introduced under 
the preceding right-wing government, seemed to offer a cheap alternative, and 
thereby a way out. The National Bank held HUF interest rates high because of 
the budgetary deficit and the ability to finance state debt. The difference between 
the interest rates for HUF loans and FX loans, coupled with less institutional 
support for HUF loans, meant that FX loans offered cheaper instalments for 
clients. The most popular of these were home equity loans backed by real estate, 
wherein the target of the loans was not restricted. Literature from the time 
reveals that experts were aware of the risk posed by fluctuating interest rates, 
but estimated this to be low (Dömötör 2011, Schepp 2008). FX loans quickly 
came to dominate the mortgage market: their share reached 63% of housing-
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related mortgages by 2008. Many factors played a part in this boom: wages 
increased, instilling optimism in many; competition between banks led to a 
growing network of advisers and agents. During the same period, the social 
rental program was cut due to fiscal pressure. The rent support program that 
replaced it failed, as it did not consider owners’ expectations appropriately 
(Hegedüs 2006: 95-96). Plans to support entrepreneurial construction programs 
for rented housing also came to a halt, since the risk of managing units in the 
insufficiently regulated private rental market was higher than the expected 
benefits.
Stage 3: Economic crisis and the responding programs (2009-2015)
The economic crisis reached Hungary in autumn 2008. Roughly one million 
households were under growing financial pressure mainly due to FX loans, 
turning mortgages into one of the most controversial, hotly discussed topics 
between 2008 and 2015. Housing politics was dominated by the issue of the 
foreign currency credit crunch and debates about the measures needed to 
alleviate it. Until 2010, programs that were introduced involved the customary 
tools of crisis management. After 2010, however, the new government introduced 
radically new and unorthodox measures, made possible domestically by the 
two-thirds electoral majority that propelled them into power. Internationally, 
it was crisis and the consequent pressure over the EU that allowed unorthodox 
measures to go unsanctioned. 
Inconsistent policies of the time suggest a lack of comprehensive planning; 
several suggestions were proposed to mitigate the social cost of the crisis and 
to stabilize the economy. After 2010, radical steps were made in the welfare 
system: unemployment programs were replaced by a controversial public work 
program (Szőke 2015), while housing maintenance and debt management 
support was cut. Social programs and the responsibility for allocating resources 
for them were pushed down to the level of local government. 
2.2.  The political economy of the mortgage crisis
Economic growth between 2004 and 2008 meant that all sides (the 
government, banks, households, the construction and development sector, 
agents, etc.) benefitted from the expanding mortgage market, even when the 
risks and profits were distributed in a starkly uneven fashion. General growth 
made these inequalities palatable politically: there was no sharp conflict. The 
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unequal distribution of costs and risks was a result of the institutional landscape 
and power structures, and was made visible only with the deepening crisis. 
All actors involved agreed that the affordability of FX loans made them 
attractive, and that the fluctuating exchange rate posed only a moderate risk. 
Banks secured their position with unilateral contracts, allowing them to 
increase interest rates, and by real estate collateral; debtors could repay unless 
their circumstances changed radically; the state did not have to step in with 
subsidies, and financial regulatory bodies did not have to intervene beyond 
declaring textbook risks.5 These actors pieced together a shared understanding 
about housing finance and the interpretation of the housing finance system, its 
risks, functions, and responsibilities that formed the basis and context of actors’ 
strategies.
Information asymmetry posed a crucial problem. Debtors often lacked 
the oversight necessary to make realistic risk assessments; this made them 
vulnerable. This was not merely a question of financial literacy, but also of 
insufficiently transparent contracts and the controversial strategies of agents and 
financial advisers. In relation to the banks, the problem of moral hazard may 
be raised; namely, the expectation of  the former that in the case of systemic 
crisis the state would need to support debtors anyway thus some of the risks 
associated with liberalized lending regulations would be pushed onto the state. 
This led to transparency on paper only; both information asymmetry and the 
banks’ calculation of moral hazard occurred in power structures that exposed 
the most vulnerable segment to disproportionate risk.
The 2008 crisis hit Hungary especially hard thanks to macroeconomic 
imbalances, irresponsible fiscal policy, and growth in the level of consumption 
that was based on mortgage lending rather than economic fundamentals. Due 
to fluctuating exchange rates, debtors’ instalments grew to an extent that many 
could not pay (Dancsik et al. 2015). Unemployment increased, and wages 
decreased. The government cut welfare spending, including housing support, 
while the banks’ strategy of increasing interest rates and service costs further 
accentuated social problems. The shared understanding broke up, replaced by 
competing strategies of allocating responsibility and blame. Without consensus, 
the crisis was maintained by competing groups that pushed for their own 
respective interests; this inflated the costs of solving it. Neither economists not 
lawyers were undivided.
5  The National Bank strengthened the currency using high-interest-rate-based policies. Director 
Járai publicly equated a strong currency with a strong economy. In the euphoria that followed EU 
accession, it would have been unfeasible to argue against euro bank loans anyway (Várhegyi 2010).
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Each group was heterogeneous, but overall we could say that the cost of the 
credit crunch could have been distributed between the state (i.e. tax-payers), 
bank shareholders, bank client, and debtors.6 As consensus was lacking about 
the responsible parties, cost allocation became a political game. Expert’s views 
can be classified into three main positions:
1.  Debtors are responsible: there is no need to ‘rescue’ debtors as they should 
have understood the risks inherent in the contracts they signed. Debtors 
subscribed to the risk of fluctuating exchange rates, the benefits of which 
they enjoyed when HUF rates were high, hence it is unreasonable to take 
over their costs.
2.  Responsibility should be shared: The cost of FX lending is distributed 
across all participants, so social and financial costs should be distributed 
fairly.
3.  Debtors are not responsible: FX lending was irresponsible in the first place, 
and abused consumers with non-transparent contracts and insufficient 
information. Debtors should be compensated and costs taken over by banks 
and the state.
The first position was articulated most clearly by Csillag and Mihályi 
(2011), who did not see the need for rescue programs. The former argued that 
competent economic policies would strengthen HUF rates again, and this would 
eliminate the need for intervention. Besides, these events would help to shake 
up a stagnating housing market. Social considerations also played a part in 
their reasoning: they thought that the bulk of FX debtors came from the middle 
class; targeting more vulnerable debtors would thus be difficult. Many analyzes 
supported this assessment; for example, Gáspár and Varga (2011) underestimated 
the number of households involved and postulated rapid improvements within 
one or two years. Even the evaluation reports of the National Bank of the time 
thought the crisis was manageable, and many in the social sector were hesitant 
to advocate for rescue programs.
The second position was shared by many analyzes that tried to juggle 
responsibilities among various players. The 2010 parliamentary committee 
that was tasked with an evaluation wrote a balanced analysis that collected the 
arguments according to which responsibilities could be determined (OGY 2012). 
The preceding and following discussions did not result in an expert consensus, 
but contributed to a fuller understanding of the contributory factors. Surányi 
(2010, 2015) emphasized the role of bad fiscal policy as well as the National 
6  Many different technical solutions may be formulated within this gross simplification but this 
would require a closer evaluation of each program, which is beyond the scope of the paper.
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Bank; however, he expected steps to be taken that would have gone beyond 
the legal and theoretical mandate of the National Bank, as others pointed out 
(Pete 2010, Obláth 2010). Discussions mostly centred around the role of past 
governments (Fidesz 1998-2002, Socialist Party-Free Democrats 2002-10), 
the National Bank, individual banks, and debtors. Disagreements remained 
prominent, but the basic proposition that costs should be shared among all actors 
who were involved was common.
The third position gained real prominence upon statements made by prominent 
economist, banking professional and green party politician Péter Róna (2013), 
who declared FX loans to be “faulty products.” Responsibility was to be shared 
by banks and insufficient state regulation. Róna’s interpretation relied on a 
specific definition of loans that denied the risks inherent to lending, that hinge 
on macroeconomic circumstances. The ‘faulty product’ concept was more of 
a political ideological tool, a vehicle of party politics than a sound economic 
concept. Róna’s views were picked up by the media and  anti-bank movements 
(Szabó 2018).7
Rescue-related problems were due to certain elements of the above 
interpretation. Bajnai’s government, formed after the resignation of PM 
Gyurcsány in 2009, subscribed to the first position. The incoming Fidesz 
government relied on various versions of the second, but more in its actual 
policies than its public communication, while social movements organized 
themselves around the third position.
3. HOUSING STRATEGIES AND THE HOUSING REGIME
3.1. Individual housing loan strategies during the expansion of 
the loan market
Economists thought that the decade-long recession in the 1990s had led to 
impatience among consumers, and this accounted for the huge demand for 
housing loans in the early 2000s (Tóth and Árvai 2001). Affordable loans not 
only contributed to housing demand, but opened the way for investment and 
consumption strategies too. Consumer credit that was used to facilitate the 
purchase of goods without depleting savings, and  home-equity loan made such 
decisions even easier. Unexpected medical costs were often paid for with such 
loans (INT 35). Such strategies put households in a financially untenable condition. 
7  Róna’s policy proposals were a lot less radical than his statements in public discussions and the 
media. 
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Housing property is not only a form of consumer goods, but also a means 
of saving and accumulation, the significance of which grows with age (Ando 
and Modigliani 1957). Theorists of asset-based welfare stress the importance 
of housing properties in accumulating savings (Doling and Ronald 2010). Low 
interest rates can be avoided by purchasing real estate, and the accumulated 
resources may be used in old age or for assisting children with home acquisition. 
With an appropriate personal contribution, it was therefore common to borrow 
for the purpose of accumulation and lease the housing units; with a 20-30% 
down-payment, rent payments could cover instalments. 
Private entrepreneurs often took out loans to make investments using real 
estate collateral. This affected the broader housing situation of the household, 
especially when the economic crisis and worsening currency rates started to 
have an impact on the labor market. In the worst case, failed investments led to 
the loss of homes, and with that, housing security issues.
The spread of free-use FX loans attracted many lower income households 
who sought to  compensate for household deficits with loans. FX loans were 
often used to pay for more expensive, preexisting loans; in these cases, they 
should be seen as means of short-term debt settlement. Many HUF loans were 
turned into FX loans, which simply postponed the moment of bankruptcy in 
many cases without addressing the structural deficit.
The motivations behind the credit boom were amplified by the contradictions 
of the economic regime and the welfare system, as these increased the risks 
households needed to take. For lower-income households especially, the fact 
that the criteria of creditworthiness changed meant an unprecedented chance 
for home ownership, which was often the only satisfactory solution. Three 
alternatives existed for such households:
•  Private rental, which left individuals vulnerable due to under-regulation and 
the black market (Hegedüs et al., 2014).
•  Substandard and/or peripheral housing choices, such as converted holiday 
houses, property in depressed areas, etc.
•  Intergenerational cohabitation, non-market solutions 
like living in flats owned by friends or family. 
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Table 3. Motivation for and key factors behind the credit boom
Motivation Key factors Interview number
Housing 
consumption 
Private rental and intergenerational cohabitation were 
considered increasingly unacceptable solutions. Private 
home ownership was seen as superior compared to the 
alternatives and cheaper in the long run.
I1, I2, I3, I26, I5, 
I6, I13, I16, I18, 
I19, I20, I21, I24
Consumption 
Economic recession in the 1990s and decreasing wages 
contributed to general consumer frustration: demand for 
cars and goods had increased by the time “cheap loans” 
arrived.
I10, I11, I15, I16, 
I17, I28
Saving
The pension system was considered insufficient and 
unreliable, thus investing in real estate was seen as a safer 
way of accumulation for the middle class.
 I2, I3, I0, I15, 
I6,  I20, I24, I25, 
I30
Investment
Labor market restructuring brought an increase in the 
number of small entrepreneurs, often motivated by the 
desire to evade tax. In the case of real small enterprises, 
shortages of capital were compensated for  using loans 
backed by real estate collateral.
I3, I11, I30, I31, 
I36, I37
Debt 
settlement
Loans borrowed for debt settlement indicate failures 
of the welfare system. These were normally related to 
unsustainable problems at the household level.
I10, I15, 
Source: authors’ compilation
It is no wonder then, that after years of renting and existing in conflict-ridden 
cohabitation (I22) or crowded flats many people virtually escaped into home 
ownership (I32). Social expectations provided a further push as renting is usually 
seen as a temporary, inferior solution that precedes appropriate solutions; i.e. 
home ownership. Renting was considered a waste of money (I16, I22), as rental 
payments were comparable to monthly instalments (see also Hegedüs and 
Teller 2007, Hegedüs and Szemző 2015). Jointly, the housing regime and these 
expectations pushed many households with an insufficient protective network 
and financial assets, etc. towards borrowing (I5, I19).
As creditworthiness was judged in an increasingly lenient fashion, local 
governments and construction permits were easily obtained, and credit agencies 
lacked proper regulation, irregularities came to characterize FX loan lending. 
One important example of systemic exploitation occurred  in relation to a 
scheme in the Avas estate, Miskolc,8 while we recorded another comparable 
example from a regional industrial capital in Western Hungary, where a Roma 
family with eight children signed a mortgage contract for 7.8 million HUF, 
8  h t tp : / /magyarnarancs .hu/k ismagyarorszag/v issza-a-ge t toba-miskolc-k isopr i -a -
feszekrakokat-90100
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although they lacked savings and had never met either representatives of the 
city council, or the bank (I32). To sum up, from the beginning of the 2000s, due 
to the accentuation of competition between banks and deflated interest rates, 
wider and wider social strata had access to loans. This offered the possibility of 
home ownership to households for whom this had not earlier been possible. We 
argue that many entered the widening housing loan market for whom the risks 
were too high.
In the first years of the credit boom, most debtors came from higher income 
households (Bethlendi 2009). Those in the top 20% according to income were 
five times more likely to take out loans, and in amounts almost 20% more than 
the average (Hegedüs 2006: 85). After 2004, the social composition of debtors 
changed, with growth in the proportion of people who would not have been 
creditworthy for HUF loans, or only for much smaller amounts. Data from 2011 
show that 8.1% of those with housing-related mortgages could be classified into 
the lowest-earning 10%, and 14.1% into the top 10% (KSH 2011). With free-
use mortgages, the situation was almost the opposite: 18.2% of borrowers came 
from the lowest earning strata, and 7.9% from the highest 10% (ibid.).
Lower income households chose home ownership in circumstances when, in a 
well-functioning housing regime, social housing or housing cooperatives would 
have been more appropriate choices for them. Their decisions were corroborated 
by the virtual absence of real alternatives in the social or private rental sector. In 
the final sections of the paper, we focus on the strategies of this most vulnerable 
stratum, relying on qualitative evidence.
3.2. Dynamics of rescue programs9
The effects of the 2008 crisis permeated the mortgage system only slowly. 
Late payments became more common: between December 2008 and December 
2009, the proportion of contracts associated with overdue payments of more 
than 90 days rose from 3.5% to 7.5% (MNB 2010). In Latvia, the proportion 
exceeded 10% by 2009 (Erbenobva et al., 2011).
The Socialist/Free Democrat Gyurcsány government did not address this 
situation with mitigation programs; political willingness and financial resources 
were both lacking. The government subscribed to the first approach, pushing 
responsibility exclusively onto  “irresponsible” debtors. Households started 
to realize the magnitude of the problem as instalments skyrocketed thanks to 
the fluctuation in interest rates as well as increases in the interest rates that 
9  This part of the paper is based on Csizmady and Hegedüs, 2016.
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banks introduced to factor in increasing risks. Banks utilized the leeway that 
unilateral contracts afforded them, expecting state intervention in case of mass 
bankruptcy. 
In 2010, when the right-wing Orbán government came to power with 
a supermajority, engineering a confrontation with banks fit the former’s 
unorthodox goals of social transformation (Várhegyi 2018). This confrontation 
allowed them to intervene in the bank sector – and to push for a share of more 
than 50% for so-called domestically owned banks. The government accepted the 
second interpretation (see earlier) which left them with ample room to fine-tune 
economic policies in service of political goals. In public communication they 
often adopted the positions of the radical opposition (i.e. the third interpretation), 
but in their programs they followed a different strategy.  
Housing politics were dominated by the management and mitigation of social 
conflicts caused by the credit crunch. The key framework was laid out in a 2011 
action plan.10 Although the government pulled rank in negotiations, it took the 
reactions of the market into consideration. However, the aims of many programs 
reached beyond housing issues (for example, intervening in positions of power 
among banks,11 the consolidation of the finances of the middle class, pacification 
of the poorest stratum, and the neutralization of political movements). 
One of the most controversial, unorthodox programs was the early repayment 
program (Table 4). This allowed borrowers to repay in a single instalment at 
a better exchange rate between September 2011 and February 2012 (PSZÁF 
2012). Early repayment targeted more affluent debtors, creating huge losses for 
banks while disregarding issues of fair redistribution and social justice, and 
reducing the potential of political mobilization. Eighteen percent of debtors used 
this opportunity (ca. 170 thousand contracts). This created 300 billion HUF of 
losses, or 1.7 million HUF per debtor. The government weighed in to incentivize 
early repayment: savings banks were ordered to offer loans, the tax office did 
not examine the origins of repayments, state organizations and companies were 
encouraged to lend to their employees, banks were threatened with repercussions 
if they sabotaged the process.
The least controversial, most successful program was offered by the National 
Asset Management Ltd. The social housing enterprise was supported by an 
10  In decree LXXV (2011) key elements of the rescue programs were present, such as the regulation 
of forced sales, an exchange rate cap, and conversion to HUF. However, repeated amendments of 
the law indicate uncertainty and a lack of long-term planning.
11  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the compromise created between banks and the 
government, but it is likely that the government exploited existing conflicts between banks and 
played a role in weakening OTP, the largest bank, while supporting FHB and savings banks, as 
was revealed during the conflicts that followed the introduction of the early repayment policy.
A HOUSING REGIME UNCHANGED 21
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
alliance of banks. Through NAM, the state bought mortgages, turning collateral 
housing units into rental constructions and allowing former owners to stay on 
as tenants, paying a fixed, heavily reduced rent. Thirty-six thousand units were 
included in the program, seven times the amount expected in the initial plan. 
Eligibility criteria and conditions changed repeatedly as the program grew. It is 
difficult to estimate the overall cost of the program, but it is thought to have been 
around 150 billion HUF, or 4.2 million per household.
Those whose status was in-between that of the most vulnerable and the 
affluent were unable to take advantage of the early repayment program or the 
NAM as they lacked savings for the former and did not fit the strict criteria 
of the latter. By 2018, the number and proportion of defaulters had decreased, 
but the reason for this was the outsourcing of cases to winding-up institutions. 
Table 4. Governmental and non-governmental programs aimed at supporting FX loan 
debtors
Social 
strata
Government programs
Banks
Social 
movements, 
alternative 
programs
Aimed at a specific group Aimed at the 
whole of societysuccessful failed
Upper 
class
Early repayment 
(2011) National 
Bank civil 
bank (2012)
Compensation of 
debtors (2014)
Conversion to 
HUF loans (2015)
Restructuring 
(continuous)
Court cases, 
protests, 
NGO 
interventions 
(continuous)
Middle 
class
Exchange rate 
cap (2012)
Working 
class
National Asset 
Management 
Ltd. (2012), 
moratorium 
on evictions 
(2009-14)
Ócsa (2014), 
Personal 
bankruptcy 
(2015)
Involving 
credit 
managers 
(after 2015)
Source: authors’ compilation
Besides the above-described two programs, several other government 
interventions were introduced. The cost of capping the exchange rate was 
paid by banks; this was less successful than early repayment, even though it 
benefited banks too. A moratorium on evictions was introduced, then maximum 
eviction quotas and obligatory currency conversion; laws concerning personal 
bankruptcy were in the making for years, only to represent a solution in less 
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than 1000 cases. These programs were subject to heated policy debates and most 
changed repeatedly, partly due to adjustments, partly thanks to changes in the 
strategies of the actors involved.
The proportion of households with housing loans grew from 7.5% in 
2000 to 15% in 2007 (Medgyesi 2008); 19% of households had mortgages 
in 2010 (KSH 2011). It is difficult to assess the number of households 
involved in different programs, but we estimate12 that 60% of those with 
mortgages (i.e. 850 thousand households) adapted without significant loss. 
Around 40% of them lost out, many through forced sales (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Proportion of households participating in various programs (estimation)
Source: authors’ estimation 
Debtors’ plight was a central theme of public discourse between 2010-2016. 
Thanks to the often changing programs and an uncertain policy landscape, 
many households hesitated to take steps; it was far from obvious when it was 
best to opt for a program when new solutions were being introduced and delays 
could result in more advantageous solutions. Many kept waiting for better 
alternatives. Uncertainty was fostered by social movements that ignited hopes 
that eventually prove false; their moderate social base was insufficient, and their 
claims that lacked legal or economic feasibility. Lawsuits were started in this 
combustible atmosphere; the government lacked direct influence over these, 
despite its supermajority. Mass lawsuits could have led to the government losing 
12  This estimation is based on the information published about early repayment programs, the 
National Asset Management program, the exchange rate debts program, and estimates of forced 
sales. 
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its discourse-setting position, hence they needed to take steps. The solution was 
a contested decree issued by the Curia according to which unilateral changes 
in interest rates and the use of different exchange rates was indeed deemed 
unfair and invalidated contracts. This took the wind out of the sails of social 
movements. Serious change was brought about by the conversion of FX loans 
to HUF loans, even though leading experts in the National Bank thought this 
solution problematic.13
Banks survived these years in a weakened political position, although by 
increasing service fees they could compensate for some of their losses. With 
restructured loans and the sale of pending claims they could rid themselves of 
political responsibility and prepare for a new period as creditors.
3.3. Household responses to the credit crunch
The difficulties households ran into paying their instalments after the 
beginning of the 2008 crisis were usually a result of one or more of the 
following factors: s worsening labor market position (I11, I12, I13, I14, I16, I19, 
I22), or individual-level issues like unexpected healthcare costs (I10, I22) or 
deteriorating family relationships, divorce, etc. (I21). Controversial and hesitant 
government reactions worsened their plight, as even households that sought to 
make rational calculations could not keep up with the changing landscape of 
options (I6, I13). Elsewhere, in countries with comparable FX loan problems, 
swift action helped households adapt (Bohle, 2014, Erbenova et al. 2011). 
Households often delayed decisions (I5, I19), hoping for better programs, not 
willing to let go of their homes, or not acknowledging the severity of problems 
soon enough (I14). Delays or not, hastily made decisions sometimes resulted in 
such imbalances that households went bankrupt (I7, I12, I15, I16).
Hence, not only strategies per se but timing was also crucial in successfully 
managing the crisis. Households needed to move beyond the myth that private 
home ownership was the only viable, safe option (I11, I16). Successful adaptation 
hinged on quickly making new assessments and identifying rescue programs 
that offered affordable solutions. Many families acknowledged their own fault 
in not assessing risks well initially (I13), but later shifted to blaming banks and 
the government (I8) (Szabó 2018).  
For many, interventions suggested they would be “rescued” and many felt 
entitled to external help. To a large extent, these false hopes contributed to 
13  Cf. Balás and Nagy 2010, and statements made by National Bank director György Matolcsy and 
Mihály Varga from the Ministry of National Development in 2012. 
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households getting stuck in crises, as they did not realize early enough that 
without taking steps they might end up in a significantly worse housing position 
than they started with (I5, I11); often, they did not accept the reality of over-
indebtedness and its implications for their social status and ended up stuck in 
homes not appropriate for their family or career situation (I13, I16). The promise 
of upward mobility many bought into with foreign-currency loans often led to 
socio-economic disintegration eventually.
While the impact of decreasing wages and growing monthly instalments was 
obvious, families could exercise various kinds of influence. The literature on 
welfare systems usually considers the role of family and friends as unequivocally 
positive (Ferrera 1996); families are thought to temper inequalities and increase 
the resilience of households. However, close ties often increase risks during 
crises, the consequences of which are borne by the broader family: taking out 
mortgages using family members’ homes as collateral and informal lending 
practices often worsen households’ positions, rather than helping (I10, I22, I32).
Individual stories illustrate housing strategies, including stories about taking 
mortgages and running into difficulty with repayments. Responses to events 
can be clustered, and these amount to typical strategies. In the qualitative 
part of our research we focused on those households for whom private home 
ownership would have been unimaginable without a mortgage and/or those who 
did not have the savings required to pay for a larger or a better located home. 
Higher consumption levels were made possible by loans for these people, but it 
was exactly the latter whose position in the labor market or in terms of family 
networks was usually less stable (I4, I14, I16).
Many were single-earner households in which incomes were often only 
partly declared or unstable; the former were more susceptible to crises as a 
loss of employment, health problems, etc. could dramatically destabilize their 
strategies. Since they often struggled financially, many of these earners took up 
work abroad, usually illegally, to be able to pay for the increase in instalments. 
This financial and emotional pressure often contributed to the dissolution of 
families. Extended families sometimes tempered these tendencies by offering 
temporary shelter, or chipping in with repayments, risking their own financial 
stability. Equally often, they were not able to help, or even added to problems by 
informal borrowing, etc.
Reactions to growing instalments and the deepening crisis may be grouped 
into six main categories:
1.  Adaptation for the purpose of maintaining a mortgage: return to the parental 
home, renting out property (I18)
  A significant way out of trouble was intergenerational cohabitation, 
allowing the renting out of the real estate in question in order to cover 
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growing instalments. Those families chose this strategy that were not able 
to keep up with payments but still wanted to hold onto property, and who 
normally came from more or less stable backgrounds they could rely on. 
Early repayment was not an option for them. This strategy was usually 
sustainable, if not ideal.
2.  Adaptation for the purpose of maintaining a mortgage: working abroad, 
emigration (I21,I31)
 Those with a relatively stable position on the Hungarian labor market 
could cope with monthly payments, but many were not able to keep up 
with growing instalments. The higher wages earned abroad allowed 
them to obtain the resources needed to service their contracts. With this 
strategy, many families were able to consolidate their housing situation, or 
even improve it, though often at the cost of compromised living standards 
abroad, at least temporarily.
3.  Adaptation for the purpose of maintaining a mortgage: sacrificing savings, 
pensions, etc. in order to keep the home as collateral (I7,I8,I9,I10,I12,I17,I
22,I28,I29)
  Many chose to hold onto homes acquired with much difficulty, undertaking 
sacrifices by cutting their consumption drastically, relying on informal 
loans, or using insurance or pension funds for repayments. Money from 
inheritance and selling valuables such as cars could support these strategies. 
Housing mobility was potentially severely compromised by this strategy, 
often for decades, and life quality was compromised. It was more common 
for younger people to avoid this strategy as they often saw more potential 
for regaining assets in the future.
4.  Default: loss of collateral, renting, or compromised housing alternatives 
(I5,I14,I15, I19,I26, I33)
  This strategy was premised upon the loss of the collateral home, which was 
most often the family home itself, but occasionally it involved other family 
members’ homes, especially those of parents and siblings. This endangered 
the stability of the extended family, while parental help was insufficient 
in many such cases, pushing these families to rent or use the remainder 
of their assets (usually after a forced sale) to move into a home of worse 
quality and/or location.
5.  Default: loss of collateral, return to the parental home (I4,I16,30)
  When the loss of a collateral-based home did not come with the erosion 
of family ties, parents often guaranteed housing stability through 
intergenerational arrangements, compromising their own comfort. Debtors 
often returned at a various stages of the life-cycle, with children, resulting 
in crowded housing conditions.
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6.  National Asset Management Ltd.: opting for social housing programs 
(I32,I39)
  NAM allowed debtors to stay in their property, giving them the right to 
purchase it back within five years. Only a small fraction of individuals 
were able to do so, even though rising real estate prices after 2015 indicated 
the economic benefits of this strategy. Flats in Ócsa that were managed by 
NAM were given to families who had already lost their homes and who had 
been forced to rent. 10-15% of tenants accumulated debt, not having paid 
the low rents. These families were made part of a comprehensive social 
mentoring program managed by the social services of the Calvinist Church 
or the Charity Service of the Order of Malta. For many families in these 
programs, borrowing was a desperate and unrealistic step, thus the stable 
conditions offered by NAM were a considerable improvement.
The above-described alternatives meant that uncertain housing situation 
returns and suboptimal housing conditions remained the only option for many. 
These marginal positions are exactly what so many families tried to break out 
from through obtaining mortgages in the first place.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Housing policy that responded to the shortcomings characteristic of post-
socialist housing regimes in Hungary aimed to strengthen both the social 
and the private rental sector. In addition, there was an attempt to develop an 
affordable market housing system around the turn of the millennium. Both the 
expansion of the mortgage market, and especially the rapid spread of FX loan 
lending, reinforced the already dominant aspect of the housing regime: i.e. 
market-integrated private home ownership. 
The 2008 crisis fundamentally changed this. FX loans generated losses 
and the cost of this needed to be distributed. Both creditors and debtors had a 
vested interest in avoiding responsibility. State intervention came in the form of 
several programs that attempted to alleviate social and economic costs, offering 
a moment to rethink the housing system as a whole, and foster change. However, 
the responses and adaptive strategies of institutions, interest groups as well as 
households yet again reinforced the problematic elements of the housing regime, 
perpetuating the key issues that preceded the economic crisis in 2008. By the 
time the housing market recovered in 2015, private home ownership was again 
reinforced as the cornerstone of housing policy, heavily relying on a better 
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fiscal background supported by EU subsidies and economic consolidation. The 
largest social housing program is now being dissolved, with no real prospect of 
substantial changes in public housing. This return to the former model misses 
the chance to correct the housing regime by building on the experiences of the 
past 15 years, thereby risking a comparable crisis in the future.
REFERENCES
Ando, A., and F. Modigliani (1957), “Tests of the life-cycle hypothesis of savings: 
Comments and suggestions”, Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics vol. 
19, pp. 99-124.
Ball, M. és M. Harloe (1992) „Rhetorical barriers to understanding housing 
provision: What the ‘provision thesis’ is and is not.” Housing Studies, 7(1): 
3-15.
Barlow, J. and Duncan, S. (1988) The use and abuse of the housing tenure 
Housing Studies, Vol 3 No 4 pp. 219-331
Barrell, R., Davis, E.F., Fic, F. and Orazgani, A. (2009) „Household Debt and 
Foreign Currency Borrowing in New Member States of the EU.” Working 
Paper No. 09-23, Brunell University West London, Department of Economics 
and Finance 
Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage.
Bethlendi András (2009) „A hazai hitelpiac empirikus vizsgálata fejlődési 
irányok, makrogazdasági és pénzügyi stabilitási következmények.” Ph.D. 
értekezés, Budapest University of Technology and Economics. https://
repozitorium.omikk.bme.hu/bitstream/handle/10890/782/er tekezes.
pdf?sequence=1 [Empirical analysis of the Hungarian loan market: 
development trajectories, consequences the macroeconomy and financial 
stability; PhD dissertation]
Bohle, Dorothee (2014) “Post-Socialist Housing Meets Transnational Finance: 
Foreign Banks, Mortgage Lending, and the Privatization of Welfare in Hungary 
and Estonia.” Review of International Political Economy, 21(4): 913–48. 
Bohle, D. (2018) Mortgaging Europe’s Periphery in: Studies in Comparative 
International Development June 2018, Volume 53, Issue 2, pp 196–217
Csillag István és Mihályi Péter (2011) „Tizenkét érv a devizahitelesek 
megmentése ellen.” Népszabadság, május 14 [Twelve arguments against 
rescuing FX-debtors]
Clapham, David (2005) The meaning of housing: a pathways approach. Bristol, 
UK: Policy Press
ADRIENNE CSIZMADY, JÓZSEF HEGEDÜS AND DIÁNA VONNÁK 28
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
Clapham, David (2002) „Housing Pathways: A Post Modern Analytical 
Framework”. Housing, Theory and Society 19(2): 57–68. https://doi.
org/10.1080/140360902760385565.
Csizmady A. and Hegedüs J. (2016) „Hungarian Mortgage Rescue Programs 
2009-2016.” NBP Working Paper No. 243 The Narodowy Bank Polski 
Workshop: Recent trends in the real estate market and its analysis – 2015 
edition Volume 1 Economic Institute Warsaw, 11-34.
Dancsik Bálint, Fábián Gergely, Fellner Zita, Horváth Gábor, Lang Péter, 
Nagy Gábor, Oláh Zsolt, Winkler Sándor (2015) „A nemteljesítő lakossági 
jelzáloghitel-portfólió átfogó elemzése.” MNB-tanulmányok különszám, 
2015 [Analyzing the mortgage-portfolio of non-compliant debtors]
Doling, J. and Ronald, R. (2010) „Home ownership and asset-based welfare.” 
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 25(2): 165–173.
Dömötör, Barbara (2011): A kockázat megjelenése a származtatott pénzügyi 
termékekben. Hitelintézeti Szemle 11: 360–369. [The risk appearing in 
financial derivatives]
Erbenova, M.,  Liu, Y. and Saxegaard, M. (2011) „Corporate and Household 
Debt Distress inLatvia: Strengthening the Incentives for a Market-Based 
Approach to Debt Resolution.” IMF Working Paper 
Ferrera M. (1996) „The ‘southern model’ of welfare in social Europe..” Journal 
of European Social Policy, 6(1): 17–37. 
Fitzpatrick, Suzanne and Mark Stephens (2014) „Welfare Regimes, Social 
Values and Homelessness: Comparing Responses to Marginalised Groups in 
Six European Countries.” Housing Studies 29(2): 215–34.
Gáspár K. and Varga Zs. (2011) „A bajban lévő lakáshitelesek elemzése 
mikroszimulációs modellezéssel.” Közgazdasági szemle, 58(6): 529-542. 
[Analyzing indebted borrowers’ situation with microsimulation]
Gazdasági Minisztérium (2000) Széchenyi Terv. Lakásprogram. Gazdasági 
Minisztérium: Budapest, 2000. December [Széchenyi Plan. Housing program]
Giddens, Anthony (1999) Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our 
Lives. London: Profile
Haffner, Marietta, Joris Hoekstra, Michael Oxley and Harry Van Der Heijden (eds.) 
(2009) „Bridging the Gap between Social and Market Rented Housing in Six 
European Countries?” Housing and Urban Policy Studies 33. Amsterdam: IOS Press
Hegedüs, J., Mayo, S. and Tosics I. (1996) „Transition of the Housing Sector 
in the East Central European Countries.” Review of Urban & Regional 
Development Studies 8(2): 101-136. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-940X.1996.tb00113.x
Hegedüs, J. and Tosics I. (1996) „Disintegration of East-European Housing 
Model.” in: Clapham, D., Hegedüs, J., Kintrea, K. and I. Tosics (eds.) Housing 
Privatization in Eastern Europe, Greenwood, 15-39.
A HOUSING REGIME UNCHANGED 29
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
Hegedüs J. and Szemző H. (2015) „The Role of Housing Assets in Shaping the 
New Welfare Regime in Transition Countries: The Case of Hungary.” In: 
Critical Housing Analysis, 2(1): 82-90.
Hegedüs J. and Teller N. (2007) „Hungary: Escape into homeownership.” In: 
Elsinga M; Decker P; Teller N and Toussaint J. (eds.) Homeownership beyond 
asset and security. Housing and Urban Policy Studies, 32. Amsterdam: IOS 
Press. 133-172.
Hegedüs József (2006) „Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai.” 
Esély, 17(5): 65-100. [Housing politics and the housing market: the limits of 
public policy]
Hegedüs József (2011) „Housing policy and the economic crisis – the case of 
Hungary.” in: Ray Forrest and Ngai-Ming Yip (eds.) Housing Markets and The 
Global Financial Crisis: The Uneven Impact On Households. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 113-130.
Hegedüs, J., V. Horváth and E. Somogyi (2014) „The Potential of Social Rental 
Agencies within Social Housing Provision in Post-Socialist Countries: The 
Case of Hungary.” European Journal of Homelessness, 8(2): 41-67. 
Hegedüs József (2018) „Lakásrezsimek rendszerváltás előtt és után a 
posztszocialista államokban.” in: Bozóki András és Füzér Katalin (szerk.) 
Lépték és irónia : Szociológiai kalandozások. 73-125. Budapest: MTA 
Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont [Housing regimes before and after the 
regime change in post-socialist countries]
Hegedüs József and Raymond Struyk (2005) „Divergences and Convergences in 
Restructuring Housing Finance in Transition Countries.” in: Hegedüs, J. and 
Struyk, R.J. (ed.) Housing Finance: New and Old Models in Central Europe, 
Russia and Kazakhstan. LGI Books, Open Society Institute, 3-41.
Hojsik, M. (2013) „Slovakia: On the way to a stable social housing concept.” in: 
Hegedüs, Lux, Teller (eds.) Social Housing in Transitional Countries, 262-277.
Kemeny, J. (1995) From Public Housing to the Social Market: Rental Policy 
Strategies in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Kemeny, J., J. Kersloot and P. Thalman (2005) „Non-profit housing, influencing, 
leading and dominating the unitary rental market: three case studies.” Housing 
Studies, 20(6): 855-872.
Kemeny, J and Lowe, S (1998) „Schools of comparative housing research: from 
convergence to divergence‟ Housing Studies, 13(2): 161-176.
Király, J. (2016): Az amerikai másodrendű jelzálogpiaci és a magyar devizahitel-
válság összehasonlító elemzése in: Simonovits 70 (szerk.: Gál Róbert és 
Király Júlia) Budapest MTA KRTK 2016, 326-350 [A comparative analysis of 
the crises of the US secondary mortgage and the Hungarian mortgage market]
KSH (1989) Családi Költségvetés, 1987. KSH Budapest. [Family budgets]
ADRIENNE CSIZMADY, JÓZSEF HEGEDÜS AND DIÁNA VONNÁK 30
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
KSH (2015) Housing survey 2015. KSH. Budapest
KSH (2011) A hitellel rendelkező háztartások szociális jellemzői. Available 
at: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/hitelesekszocjell.pdf [Social 
charactersitics of households with loans]
Le Grand, J. (2003) Motivation, agency, and public policy of knights and knaves, 
pawns and queens. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003.
Lin, Justin Yifu (2012) New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking 
Development and Industrial Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Lowe, Stuart (2003) „Housing in post-communist Europe – Issues and agenda.” 
in: Lowe and Tsenkova (eds.) Housing Change in East and Central Europe: 
Integration or Fragmentation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 21-44. ISBN: 0754618145, 
9780754618140
Lundqvist, Lennart J. (1990) „Rolling Stones for the Resurrection of Policy 
as the Focus of Comparative Housing Research.” Paper presented at the 
International Housing Conference Housing Debates – Urban Challenges’, 
Paris, 3-6 July
Malpass, Peter (2008) „Housing and the New Welfare State: Wobbly Pillar or 
Cornerstone?” Housing Studies, 23(1): 1-19.
Matznetter, Walter (2002) „Social Housing Policy in a Conservative Welfare 
State: Austria as an Example.” Urban Studies 39(2): 265–82.
Matznetter, Walter and Alexis Mundt (2012) „Housing and Welfare Regimes.” in 
The SAGE Handbook of Housing Studies, 274–94. London: Sage Publications
Medgyesi Márton (2008) „Jut is? Marad is? A háztartások megtakarításai.” 
in: Szivós Péter and Tóth István György (szerk.) Köz, teher, elosztás Tárki 
Monitor Jelentések, 155-173. [Household savings: enough and to spare?]
MNB (2010) Jelentés a pénzügyi stabilitásról, 2010 április [Report on financial 
stability, April 2010]
Növekedéskutató Intézet (1999) Reális Lakáspolitika. Available at: http://www.
lakasepitesert.hu/upload/1999%20Re%C3%A1lis%20lak%C3%A1spolitika.
pdf [Realisting housing politics]
Oblath Gábor (2010) „Ki, miben felelős? Észrevételek Surányi György 
diagnózis- és terápia-kritikájához.” KTI blog. Available at: http://blog.mtakti.
hu/blog_cikkek/index.php?leftmenuid[leftmenuid]=5&cikk_listazo[pager]
[pg]=240 [Who is responsible for what? On György Surányi’s crititcisms of 
dignosis and therapy]
OGY (2012) Az Országgyűlés Alkotmányügyi, igazságügyi és ügyrendi 
bizottságának jelentése a 2002-2010. közötti lakossági deviza-eladósodás 
okainak feltárásáról, valamint az esetleges kormányzati felelősség vizsgálatáról. 
2012 február. Available at: http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/05881/05881.
pdf [Report on the reasons of FX-indebtedness and an analysis of potential 
A HOUSING REGIME UNCHANGED 31
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
governmental responsibility by the Parliament’s Constitutional, Judicial and 
Procedural Committee]
O'Malley, Pat (2004) Risk, uncertainty and government. London: Glasshouse 
Press.
Otthon Európában (2003) Otthon Európában – A nemzeti lakásprogram pillérei. 
Budapest, 2003 Nozeti Lakásprogram Iroda, 2003 [At home in Europe — 
Pillars of the national housing program]
Pavlovskaya, M. (2004) „Other transitions: multiple economies of Moscow 
households in the 1990s.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
94(2): 329–351.
Pete Péter (2010) „Felelős.” Magyar Narancs 2010/7 Available at: http://
magyarnarancs.hu/egotripp/felelos-73196 [Responsible]
Pichler-Milanovich, Natasha (2001) „Urban housing markets in central and 
eastern Europe: Convergence, divergence or policy collapse.” European 
Journal of Housing Policy 1(2):145-187
PSZÁF (2012) Gyorselemzés a végtörlesztésről. Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami 
Felügyelete, 2012 https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/gyorselemzes-vegtorlesztes-
120312j.pdf [A quick assessment of the early repayment program]
Ries, Nancy (1997) Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perestroika. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
Róna Péter (2013) „Hibás termék.” Magyar Nemzet, 2013 augusztus 8. http://
balazs.pergamen.hu/downloads/hibas_termek.pdf [Faulty product]
Roy, F (2008) „Mortgage Markets in Central and Eastern Europe – a review 
of past experiences and future perspectives‟, European Journal of Housing 
Policy, 8(2): 133-160
Schepp, Zoltán (2008): Néhány gondolat a változó kamatozású 
devizafinanszírozás kockázatairól. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 1, 67-90.
Small, Mario Luis (2009): “How many cases do I need?”: On science and the 
logic of the case selection in the field based research, Ethnography 2009/10, 
5-35 
Stephens, Mark, Martin Lux and Petr Sunega (2015) „Post-Socialist Housing 
Systems in Europe: Housing Welfare Regimes by Default?” Housing Studies 
30(8): 1210–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2015.1013090
Surányi Gy. (2010) „Téves diagnózis, téves terápia.” Népszabadság, 2010, január 
30 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/teves_diagnozis__teves_terapia-525601 [False 
diagnosis, false therapy]
Surányi György (2015) „A jegybank mindenben hibázott, amiben lehetett.” 
Origo, 2015.2.24 http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/20150223-suranyi-gyorgy-a-
jegybank-mindenben-hibazott-amiben-lehetett.html [The reserve bank made 
all possible mistakes]
ADRIENNE CSIZMADY, JÓZSEF HEGEDÜS AND DIÁNA VONNÁK 32
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
Szabó, Natasa (2018) „We are the State, We are the People: Forex Loan Debtors’ 
Struggles for Citizenship in Hungary.” MA thesis at Central European 
University, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology
Székely, Gáborné (2011) Társadalmi helyzetkép 2010. Lakáshelyzet. [Social 
state of play 10. Housing conditions], HCSO, Budapest, 2011.
Szőke, A. (2015). A ‘Road to Work’? The reworking of deservedness, social 
citizenship and public work programmes in rural Hungary. Citizenship 
Studies, 19(6-7), 734-750.
Tsenkova, Sasha (2009) Housing Policy Reforms in Post Socialist Europe: Lost 
in Transition. Springer
Tóth, I. János, and Árvai Zsófia (2001) „Likviditási korlát és fogyasztói 
türelmetlenség. A magyar háztartások fogyasztási és megtakarítási 
döntéseinek empirikus vizsgálata.” Közgazdasági Szemle XLVIII.(12): 1009–
38. [Liquidity limits and consumer inpatience. An empirical analysis of 
Várhegyi Éva (2002) „Polgári Otthon.” Magyar Narancs 2002/11 Available 
at: https://magyarnarancs.hu/egotripp/varhegyi_eva_ekotrip-55652 [Middle 
Class Home]
Várhegyi Éva (2010) „Hitelek fogságában.” Élet és Irodalom, LXII. 42. Available 
at: https://www.es.hu/cikk/2010-10-2/varhegyi-eva/hitelek-fogsagaban.html 
[Caught in loans]
Várhegyi Éva (2018) „Bankcsapda.” Magyar Narancs, 2018/8 2018.2.2. http://
magyarnarancs.hu/publicisztika/bankcsapda-109480 [Bank-trap]
Zsoldos István (1997) „A lakosság megtakarítási és portfólió döntései 
Magyarországon 1980-1996 között.” MNB Füzetek, 1997/4 [Individual saving 
and portfolio decisions in Hungary, 1980-1996]
A HOUSING REGIME UNCHANGED 33
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
APPENDIX: LIST OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
Types:
1. Return to parents, rent own flat. 
2. Loss of home, new rented home or residual housing.
3. Loss of home, living with family/parents.
4. Keeping home through substantial sacrifices, pooling resources.
5. Work abroad. 
6. Social housing – National Asset Management Ltd.
7. No crisis, or was able to buy a new home with family support.
8. Under execution
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